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INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETING STRATEGY 
1: INTRODUCTION 
Major changes are occurring in both industries and markets in the 
business environment of the 1990's. These are changes arising 
from political and economic shifts such as the opening of Eastern 
Europe and a reunified Germany, regulatory shifts such as the 
completion of the EC Single Market, or cultural, structural and 
technological shifts resulting in the internationalisation and, in 
some cases, globalisation of whole industries. The cumulative 
effect of all these separate strands is the accelerating pace and 
scope of change. This has led to a major change agenda for 
companies regarding their strategies and organisational 
arrangements to meet these new conditions. Multinational 
companies are concerning themselves with new procedures for 
integrating and coordinating their international activities 
(Prahalad & DOZ, 1987; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989). 
One element of this is the challenge it presents to traditional 
ways of thinking about marketing. Such a review of strategic 
thinking in marketing would include such basic elements as the 
nature of positioning and product development. However, even more 
fundamental in the rise of international marketing activity is the 
division between the strategic, centralised elements of marketing 
and those elements seen as operational and tactical. The changing 
boundary between these two requires urgent exploration. 
This paper looks at some of these issues in the context of the 
food processing industry in Europe. This is an industry which has 
been traditionally country-centred, marked by strong national 
brands, conditioned by retailer buying power and rather short-term 
in its thinking. It is certainly an industry in which local 
adaptation of products for highly differentiated national markets 
has been the norm. A spate of recent international acquisition 
activity has resulted in a more concentrated industry marked by 
large multinational companies with extensive portfolios of major 
brands. It is therefore a particularly interesting industry in 
which to review the extent of the development of international 
marketing and its effect on the corporate strategies of major 
competitors. 
2: THE IDEA OF STRATEGIC SPACE 
Porter's (1980) popularization of the competitive strategy 
framework laid some emphasis on the evolution of industries and 
the triggers for industry change. Industry evolution, however, 
has been a relatively neglected issue both in the academic and 
practitioner-based writings. Porter correctly emphasized the need 
for a dynamic analysis of industries, but it has been his static 
analysis of industry structure that has received most attention. 
Not much attention has been paid to the dynamics of change and the 
associated patterns of asset accumulation by incumbents and new 
entrants and to the tactical exploitation of these new 
investments. 
Industry evolution is conventionally portrayed in terms of 
corporate responses to exogenous shifts in underlying demand and 
cost conditions. These responses themselves trigger a round of 
endogenously generated shifts until the industry settles to a new 
equilibrium. The triggers for change may be some combination of 
exogenous and endogenous factors but the medium through which 
evolution takes place is the set of asset adjustments over time. 
Firms as possessors of idiosyncratic capital and the set of loose 
associations known as an industry are linked by the idea of 
strategic groups. The term was coined by Hunt (1972), popularized 
by Caves and Porter (1977) and has been the subject of much 
attention since. It has be& described by McGee (1985) as 
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. . a device to segment industries into sets of companies 
whose competitors, actions, and results are relevant to each 
other, occupying the imagined, conceptual space between firm 
and industry." 
Essentially strategic groups are groups of firms in an industry 
which follow the same or similar strategies. The strategies are 
defined in terms of the assets of firms from which group members 
develop their market positioning and competitive tactics. The 
essence of group membership is that asset configurations represent 
"mobility barriers" (Caves & Porter, 1977; McGee 1985), which 
inhibit group members from acquiring alternative assets, but which 
also protect them from members of other groups acquiring similar 
assets to their own. Thus, an industry is composed of 'structures 
within structures'. Whereas The broad category "industry" is 
notoriously difficult to define with any precision, the internal 
structures within an industry - the strategic groups - can be 
defined with some accuracy in terms of the nature of the assets 
specific to each group. 
The key to understanding industry evolution lies in the ways in 
which firms change their asset structures. In other words, the 
ways in which mobility barriers change should be the focus of 
attention. Changes in mobility barriers provide the explanation 
of differences between industry structures over time. Potential 
profit differences between groups can exist only when barriers to 
casual.or opportunistic imitation of strategic position are 
present. The strategies of firms are concerned with erecting and 
sustaining mobility barriers, and exploiting the relative 
competitive advantages they represent in the market place. But 
strategies are also concerned with finding ways around mobility 
barriers so as to compete in other, more profitable ways. Thus 
industry evolution is a product of the ways in which mobility 
barriers decay and others arise in their place. 
McGee and Thomas (1986) enumerate mobility barriers in three main 
categories: market-related assets ("downstream" in the value 
chain), production and logistics assets ("upstream"), and 
infrastructure and corporate assets. Mobility barriers are assets 
created by firms in response to the competitive environment faced 
by the firm but also are conditioned by the firm's history and 
culture, in particular its historic accumulation of tangible and 
intangible assets. 
Unilever, one of the major European food companies, sees changes 
in all three types of mobility barrier. W ith regard to market . . _ 
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Europeanisation of eating habits is moving ahead slowly but 
surely" (Maljers, 1989). He expects uniformity of markets to be 
achieved alongside a greater variety of products and he therefore 
anticipates a shift of industry characteristics in favour of the 
big international companies who will be better able to pursue the 
increasing economies of scale available in production, marketing 
and distribution. Unilever's own assessment suggests a slow but 
steady convergence on the demand side coupled with scale 
developments in manufacturing and distribution. Thus the new 
situation will require a new set of investments. 
Before looking more closely at the strategic group structures 
within the food industry we review the long term evolution of the 
industry up to the late 1980's. 
3: STRATEGIC SPACE ANALYSIS OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The European food processing industry has passed through a number 
of phases each with its particular set of asset structures and 
business concepts. The UK industry, for example, has seen an 
early period of wholesaler domination (Kaldor 1980), followed by 
manufacturer domination from 1930-60, then the period of the scale 
economy brander (Foy 1980), and the rise of the retailer in the 
1970's and 1980's (Segal-Horn & McGee 1989). The next phase could 
see the emergence of the Euroconsumer. 
The Scale Economy Brander 
The consumer packaged goods industry (including the food 
processing industry) enjoyed halcyon days in the sixties. This 
was a period when mass markets were growing quickly, retail 
distribution was highly fragmented, economies of scale were 
available, and processing technologies were proprietary. 
Substantial economic advantages were gained by the creation of 
mass marketing systems, comprising national media advertising, 
national sales forces, and increasingly sophisticated marketing 
support services. The visible output of this business system was 
the brand, the repository of guarantees to the customer of product 
qualities arising from proprietary technology. The creation of the 
brand was subject to many economies of marketing scale, and itself 
fostered scale economies available elsewhere in the system. The 
brand was the visible symbol of the manufacturers' strength, and 
was the barrier to entry behind which grew a number of highly 
profitable oligopolies. 
The Rise of the Retailer 
The heyday of the scale economy brander (the late 1960's) was, 
however, a period in which the seeds of change were already 
evident. The large retailer, both in the UK and Europe, was 
becoming more and more significant. His position in the UK was 
transformed by the abolition of Retail Price Maintenance in 1964 
allowina retailers the freedom to set prices. Furthermore, 
the balance of power shifted from the manufacturer to the 
retailer, just as in the early 20th Century it had shifted from 
the wholesaler to the manufacturer. The emergence of large scale 
national retailers in Europe made for dramatic change. The 
consumer was now faced with a new proposition. Price-led 
competition was supported by retailer brands as distinct from the 
non-price competition of manufacturers brands. This was furthered 
by the entry of smaller-scale processors, who could now find 
available customers for private label and whose access to 
technology and to efficient plant was not blocked by proprietary 
technology. In addition, retailers began to reorganize the inward 
logistics of their business thereby diluting the distribution 
economies of the major manufacturers and making possible new 
specialized distribution companies. The emergence of national 
retail accounts diluted the national sales forces of processors 
and undermined their product management structure. 
This is now a familiar story moderated only by some variance 
between product groups. For example, brands for breakfast cereals 
have held up very well. Elsewhere, the strategic initiative was 
taken over by retailers and by the new entrants into food 
processing. The key change was increased concentration of 
retailing as the majors built larger and larger outlets, took oyf: 
marketing strategy and steadily developed their businesses to 
include distribution, own-branding, research (a little) and 
development (much more), and broader product ranges. The retail 
trade was able to pressure manufacturers' brands toward commodity 
status, to brand themselves rather than their products, and to 
gain very substantial efficiencies. Strategic change in retailing 
fundamentally undermined the strategic position of manufacturers. 
The Rise of the Euro-Brander? 
Existing EC food law defines detailed requirements for the 
composition of specific foodstuffs. These have proved difficult 
to agree, are quite complicated and are full of numerous national 
exceptions (derogations). According to MAC (1988): 
"nearly every EEC country operates with different label 
requirements, which implies that an EEC producer is 
effectively prohibited from using a uniform label for its EEC 
sales. The amount of information required on the label 
varies from country to country . . . Exhaustive requirements 
like this . . . form a subtle but effective barrier to trade 
The Commission's proposed legislation is contained in four 
framework directives designed to bring an end to the national 
exceptions, to provide a more informative system of food labelling 
and to set general food safety and hygiene standards. 
At first sight, these may not appear to be promising triggers for 
major change. However, MAC (1988) examined trade barriers in ten 
product sectors identifying over 200 barriers (not all of which 
would be subject to removal by the new directives). MAC estimated 
that the quantifiable direct benefits of removing these barriers 
are themselves significant amounting to 2 - 3% of industry value 
added. Furthermore, the indirect net benefits would be larger, 
including the broadening of consumer choice, a significant . 
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competitiveness of EEC food companies vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world. The report concludes: 
"The existence of trade barriers . . . has served to protect 
potentially weak domestic companies, and inversely, has 
encouraged strong companies to expand domestically rather 
than attempt cross-border expansion. These features of trade 
barriers have reinforced the relative fragmentation of the 
EEC food industry. Removal of these barriers should decrease 
or eliminate these tendencies". 
This dismantling of obstacles to trade comes at a time when 
national markets are becoming saturated and life cycles of 
competitive advantage are shortening, when there is an 
increasingly international orientation of consumers and a growing 
homogeneity of demand around the world, and when the importance of 
international sourcing is rising. Taken in conjunction with the 
decreasing importance of national laws, regulations, and tastes 
and the liberalization of capital markets we have a strong a 
priori case for changes in structural characteristics of the 
industry and a shift towards a more integrated "European" 
industry. 
If this is indeed the case, then companies will be rethinking 
their segmentation concepts and their targeting strategies and 
considering how to integrate their marketing across the regions of 
Europe. This is in contrast with the traditional thinking of.the 
majority of packaged goods multinationals who presently run their 
international operations as a portfolio of national strategies. 
AS a new orientation to markets gathers pace, already visible is a 
new attitude to manufacturing. Many manufacturers are searching 
for plants flexible enough for a wide product range so as to serve 
multiple segments. It is also becoming clear that in many 
industries, there are gains to be realized from rationalizing 
manufacturing capacity across Europe (Cecchini 1988). In 
particular, some are looking for scale-efficient sourcing for 
European markets. The stage looks set for the creation of new 
asset structures and for the evolution of the industry to a new 
stage.' 
3.2 STRATEGIC GROUPS IN THE FOOD INDUSTRY 
A simple bivariate analysis can capture the salient 
characteristics of the industry. First, the importance of brands 
in the food industry cannot be over-emphasized. National branding 
is the traditional source of competitive advantage and, as PIMS 
has shown, brand share is commonly associated with superior 
profitability. The size of national retailers (in the UK at 
least) has substantially eroded the strength of many brands, 
replacing product branding with their own form of branding (own- 
labelling). However, manufacturers' brands do remain significant 
but are as yet mainly focussed on national markets. MAC (1988) 
has shown that out of a sample of 46 EC-based food companies, one 
half have a presence in two EC countries or less. 
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Second, building the geographic coverage of key brands is held to 
be of increasing competitive significance. It lies behind the 
patterns of acquisitions, disposals, and "swaps' which is well 
advanced among US food companies and is getting under way in 
Europe. 
This is demonstrated in Gogel & Larreche's (1989) Competitive 
Posture matrix which compares US, Swiss and EC companies on the 
basis of product strength and geographic coverage. They conclude 
that the US food companies (such as Coca-Cola, Kellogs, and Mars) 
are significantly further advanced than the Europeans in both 
brand strength and geographic coverage, whilst the Swiss (Nestle 
and Jacobs Suchard) are significantly stronger in geographic 
coverage. Since Philip Morris of the USA acquired Jacobs Suchard 
in 1990, geographic coverage for yet another US food company has 
been further consolidated. 
Our analysis follows the same approach (Figure 1) but for brand or 
product strength is substituted marketing intensity, a measure of 
the costs of marketing relative to total costs or to total added 
value. This reflects not only brand strength but also the nature 
of costs in the marketing function, specifically the possibilities 
to exploit scale effects in marketing across borders to larger 
market sizes. Production and logistics characteristics are not 
represented in the grouping analysis partly because these assets 
did not seem to act as a discriminator between the groups. R&D 
capability is, to some degree, reflected in the marketing 
dimension, insofar as branding often demands proprietary process 
knowledge and development skills. 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Group Al (footnote 1) is composed of the Multinational Major 
Branders (e.g. Unilever, BSN, Heinz). These are multinational 
companies operating multiple, related consumer goods businesses 
across the world, with strong perceived product differentiation 
accompanied by strong branding. These companies have been 
traditionally multi-domestic in character (as opposed to global 
(see Porter 1986) or transnational (see Bartlett & Ghoshal 1989)). 
[Footnote 1: These groups are based on cluster analyses of some 
markets, interview data with industry executives, and the 
researchers' estimates.] 
In Group A3 are The National Major Branders (e.g. St Ivel). These 
are nationally based and focussed companies with very high levels 
of marketing support for a product range, which, by the standards 
of the Multinationals, is quite limited. 
The Minor National Branders in Group B2 (e.g. Typhoo) are 
typically not national market leaders and not large in absolute 
terms. They supplement their local brands with opportunistic 
export supplies into other national markets in order to maintain 
volume. This category is probably not uniformly present across 
the different food sectors. 
In Group C3 are The National Own-Label Suppliers (e.g. Hillsdown) 
who focus on low cost production (sometimes with advanced 
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production processes) and supply retailers mainly within their own 
countries. 
The mobility barriers attached to these groups are summarized in 
Figure 2 on a three by three grid corresponding to Figure 1. In 
general, these barriers are sufficiently high to permit some 
degree of stability in these structures. For multinationals, the 
barriers are very high and are being further raised due to 
increasing levels of advertising and expansion of international 
operations. Competitive pressure is essentially intra-group 
although the Own Label Suppliers impose some limits on their price 
premiums and the National Major Branders compete head on with 
certain of their innovative brands. 
The National Major Branders are also in a good defensive position 
with local first mover advantages that are difficult to overcome. 
They seek to maintain the barriers with heavy marketing support 
but are becoming increasingly vulnerable as new products become 
more expensive to launch. The Minor National Branders are 
probably in the most exposed situation. They are susceptible to 
major brand competition on one side and low price competition on 
the other. They strive to create a defensible position through 
strategic pricing and by attempts to be very flexible in 
production. 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
The National Own Label Suppliers are also in a potentially 
difficult position. Their barriers arise from strategic 
investment in sufficiently large and advanced manufacturing 
facilities so as to obtain economies of scale. In sectors where 
scale effects are minimal intra-group rivalry is very high and 
incursions from foreign own label suppliers is a dangerous threat. 
New entrants from outside the industry might find this group a 
useful bridgehead into the industry. 
3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC SPACE 
A cluster analysis by Duckett (1990) on one product sector 
suggests that the strategic space in which these groups are held 
is sufficiently large and has enough "empty" space to allow for 
possible shifts in the configuration of the strategic groups. 
Figure 3 illustrates the way in which the strategic space can be 
divided (for illustrative purposes) into a three by three grid. 
Existing groups Al, A3, B2 & Cl take four of the spaces leaving 
five further possibilities two of which are infeasible under 
current conditions and likely to remain so. 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
The effect of the Single Market legislation and of the Food 
Directives in particular is to make individual country markets 
more immediately accessible (not more identical). In the longer 
term consumers in different national markets may indeed converge 
making possible efficiencies in marketing to larger segments 
across national boundaries. There will therefore be pressures to 
drive companies "Northwards" and "Westwards" in this strategic 
space. 
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Own label suppliers will be tempted to move into sub-space C2 to 
supply similar own label products across wider areas. However, 
the real prize will be to supply own brands to retailers across 
Europe (sub-space Cl). The advantages could arise from full 
exploitation of potential scale economies especially in 
production. Lower cost distribution would assist the move, and 
there might be rewards from greater concentration vis-a-vis the 
retail trade. However, the difficulties will lie in the degree of 
national differences to be imposed on the standard own label 
product and the different legislative environments that will still 
have an impact regardless of the Single Market. 
Harmonization would make a considerable difference to the present 
situation. The lack of rivalry from other groups outside the own 
label sectors makes own label look attractive although within own 
label the rivalry could be intense. The keys to success are 
likely to be the ability to meet retailers' demands for advanced 
products at low cost through scale-efficient and perhaps 
technically advanced production facilities. First-mover 
advantages might be considerable, particularly if the market is 
limited. The viability of regional strategies (i.e. C2) depends 
on the non-viability of the full European Strategy (Cl). If sub- 
space Cl exists it will dominate the regional suppliers because of 
the sheer size of scale effects. One scenario would have the 
regional move as a stepping stone on the way to "full" European 
coverage. Another might see the regional player as a more natural 
unit but locked in fierce rivalry with those both bigger and 
smaller. Retailers will play a significant role in determining 
the outcome by virtue of the way they can exercise their current 
power in allocating contracts, sponsoring new players, and forming 
joint ventures. 
Sub-space B3 is one of those available but unoccupied. It is 
sandwiched between powerful national branders and national own 
branders. There will continue to be a fragmented rump of national 
players but Europe will not offer them any special opportunities 
except perhaps through some form of consolidation. 
Sub-space Bl will become very interesting. In theory, this will 
be the home of Pan-European Branders pursuing a strategy of 
marketing common branded products throughout Europe. This would 
allow economies of scale to be achieved in all functions, 
including marketing. This would lead, therefore, to rather lower 
marketing intensities than their multi-domestically organised 
rivals (in Al). They would be insulated from the price 
competition of own labels and would be competitors to nationally- 
based brands including those Multinational and National players 
who do not opt for a trans-European style of operation. 
Increasingly Europe-wide media, lower logistics costs, and the 
relaxing of legislative differences plus increasingly homogeneous 
consumers would all make a trans-European group more likely to be 
sustainable. Essential to success will be the ability to organize 
and manage in a transnational style, something which Bartlett & 
Ghoshal (1989) observe is poorly practised anywhere in the world, 
let alone by European companies. The prospect looks attractive, 
but the journey may be hazardous. 
Sub-space A2 is also available but relatively unoccupied at 
present. It can be called the Regional Brander and has some . . . . , , _ _ _ I I 'I 1 _ I 7-L d-. - ...-.CTrV-31 
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expansion path for the National Branders as well as a possible 
route of development for the weak national branders alongside them 
in the space. However, one can see the prospect of quite fierce 
rivalry in this area. The Multinationals will be anxious to 
preserve their (national) brand positions especially if they are 
seeking to Europeanize their brands. The remaining national 
players will be very actively seeking to defend their positions 
against attacks from trans-Europeans, Multinationals, the power of 
retailers, not to mention any new regional branders. 
The Minor National Branders in the centre of the strategic space 
(B2) are going to feel encircled if the growth in own brands 
across Europe and the development of trans-European brands takes 
place. The emergence of strong Regional and Pan-European Own 
Label Suppliers (in C2 & Cl) would make their opportunistic plays 
across national boundaries extremely marginal. This group like 
the one underneath it (Bl) is likely to become fragmented and only 
marginally profitable. 
The Multinational Major Branders (in Al) are well placed to defend 
themselves and would enjoy either the status quo or a very slow 
process of change. However, they are also very well placed to see 
and understand the opportunities, particularly those opportunities 
that would enable them to improve their global position. So the 
stakes are very high for this group. Any move to a transnational 
or trans-European style would compromise their huge investments in 
national brands and in country management structures. The 
immediate opportunity to rationalize production and logistics 
across Europe will give them a very good picture of how a 
marketing change or revolution might be managed at a later date. 
Their great advantage over the national players is their 
international experience and one would expect them to capitalize 
on this. So on the whole we would expect to see a gradual 
migration into the trans-European group, 
The National Major Branders (in A3) are faced with great 
opportunities but probably see them as immense difficulties. 
Their great strength is local\national and there is always likely 
to be some room for the new niche players of Europe. The big 
uncertainty is, that no-one can say how much room. On the other 
side the opportunity to expand looks fraught with uncertainty. 
The international expertise is not there, nor are the 
organizational subtleties and skills required to manage across 
borders. Many of these players will seek collaborations and 
alliances as early steps. They will experiment with regional 
moves and hope to move in the direction of trans-European 
strategies (in Bl). But this will very likely take a long time - 
the mobility barriers are very high. 
Figure 4 illustrates the possible shifts in the strategic group 
configuration over time. This suggests that 1992 will cause some 
major discontinuities with major implications for existing 
strategic groups, members of which may be forced to exit from the 
industry, alter their strategy, or seek salvation in conjunction 
with others. The industry is likely to go through a confused and 
uncertain period over the next five years. It may take up to ten 
years for the bulk of the major players to read and understand the 
new environment and for the‘industry to begin a clear convergence 
onto a new structure. 
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FIGURE 4 HERE 
We anticipate two main avenues for strategy change as the food 
industry evolves over the next ten years or so. The first will be 
a restructuring, consolidation, efficiency-seeking change. There 
will be a large reduction in numbers of plants and numbers of 
companies. There will be some simple closures and re-allocations 
of production within firms. There will be a spate of acquisitions 
of companies with distinctive assets, such as brand names or 
distribution (but probably not manufacturing). Many small and 
smaller firms will be compelled to exit. The driving force in 
this scenario is the search for low cost through efficiency in 
production, distribution, and marketing. By itself, this might 
not be so dramatic but for the strong possibility of new forms of 
competition based on new segmentation, branding, and new products. 
So there will also be a premium on the rediscovery of marketing 
(especially international marketing skills) facilitated by joint 
ventures (products for markets, for example), and swaps of 
facilities to round out product lines and segment portfolios. The 
conjunction of efficiency seeking with marketing and product 
innovation is likely to prove complex and highly disturbing to the 
existing industry structure. 
3.4 IMPLICATIONS 
This analysis suggests that a combination of exogeneous and 
endogenous triggers will impel European food companies 
progressively "Northward" and "Westward" on the strategic space 
map towards two currently vacant strategic spaces in which will be 
found Pan-European Own Label suppliers and Pan-European Branders 
respectively. Along with strong National Branders and 
Multinational Branders these will constitute, it is argued, a new 
configuration of strategic groups and a new pattern of competition 
in the European food industry of the next century. 
For this scenario to come true, the mobility barriers preventing 
this movement "Northward" and "Westward" must seen to be 
diminishing in. strength relative to the mobility "capacity" of the 
firms involved. We would expect to see companies making 
particular kinds of investments in products, technologies and 
brand names, as well as adopting different approaches to 
manufacturing, marketing and distribution. Although much of this 
evidence for this is fragmented and contradictory, as would be 
expected in an industry in the early stages of significant change, 
some tentative conclusions can be drawn. 
The principal themes which emerge from the evidence are cost-push 
and demand-pull. The "cost" theme addresses the possibilities for 
change in scale economies and for other step changes in unit 
costs. The "demand" theme contains the debate about the emergence 
of Euro-markets at the expense of national markets. This means a 
Europe-wide positioning of corporations, products and brands to 
provide a strong pan-European image and a high degree of 
standardisation in marketing programmes across Europe. However, 
the European food industry is historically fragmented in structure 
and local in character (Burns, McInerney, & Swinbank, 1983; 
Swinbank & Burns, 1984; Capara, 1989; Sparks, 1989). The food _ . . 
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distributors and end-consumers. Any shift towards a Europe-wide 
policy would constitute a radical change in the behaviour of the 
industry members. 
The next section discusses the extent to which any such shifts are 
discernible as yet in the marketing strategies of European food 
companies. 
4 THE EFFECT ON MARKETS AND MARKETING 
The Debate 
There are two opposing views of international marketing. The 
first treats marketing essentially as a local problem, emphasizing 
differences between countries, consumers and in marketing systems. 
It advocates tailor-made marketing programmes for each country to 
be managed locally. The emphasis placed by so many industrialists 
and commentators on country-specific differences in food tastes 
and preferences reflects the fact that Europe is .only at the 
beginning of any real effort at Europe-wide demand-creation. 
The second view believes much more in the growth of common 
customer needs across countries and the ability of companies to 
treat marketing not just as a transferable skill but as the basis 
for creating competitive strategy. This view emphasizes the 
benefits of standardization, argues for common marketing 
programmes across countries and believes in a strong, centralised 
marketing organization. Given the vehement views expressed in 
this national versus standardised consumer tastes argument 
(Capara, 1989), it is interesting to note the experience of the UK 
chocolate confectionery market, the richest chocolate market in 
Europe. A 53% increase in imports in 1989 made Britain a net 
importer of chocolate for the first time. Reasons for the shift 
include the stocking of continental chocolates by UK mass retail 
chains such as Marks & Spencer and the dynamic entry of Jacobs 
Suchard into the mass chocolate bar market. However, more far- 
reaching general trends in demand-creation are at work. Retailers 
are increasingly sourcing their own-label products abroad and this 
trend is seen by the industry (Cadbury Annual Review, 1989) as 
being reinforced by the influence on consumer taste of foreign 
travel and Pan-European advertising. So, more international 
sourcing by retailers and changing consumer preferences appear to 
be far-reaching in nature. 
Reconciling the polar opinions in the national\EC debate (and the 
local\global debate) is obviously difficult if only because each 
seems sometimes to be appropriate. However, there are very strong 
reasons why companies should wish to do both simultaneously. In 
other words the tendencies to standardisation are there and the 
benefits promise to be sizeable. However, the country to country 
differences are also substantial and cannot be ignored. What has 
changed is that the benefits to standardisation have considerably 
increased and are beginning to be reflected in research. Consider 
the data in Table 1: 
TABLE I 
/ 
I 
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Selected US and European Multinationals 
Elements of Marketing Programme Degree of Standardisation 
1 Product Characteristics 
2 Brand Name 
3 Packaging 
4 Retail Price 
5 Basic Advertising Message 
6 Creative Expression 
7 Sales Promotion 
8 Media Allocation 
9 Role of Sales Force 
10 Management of Sales Force 
11 Role of M iddleman 
12 Type of Retail Outlet 
High Medium Low 
81 4 15 
75 5 20 
56 14 30 
71 6 20 
62 4 34 
56 11 33 
43 10 47 
74 10 15 
72 10 17 
80 7 13 
59 7 34 
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Source: Sorensen R. & Weichmann U. (1975) 
Standardisation is particularly evident with respect to brand 
name, product characteristics, role of m iddleman, packaging, role 
and management of sales force and basic advertising message. 
These are all still considered controversial areas for 
standardisation, yet more recent research confirms these 
conclusions. Takeuchi & Porter (1986) examined some of the most 
common activities within the marketing function based on ease or 
difficulty of international co-ordination. The results were based 
on the trade off between the organisational costs of co-ordination 
and the scale economies available from standardisation. Table 2 
gives their assessment of the extent to which national differences 
make standardisation of particular marketing activities easier or 
more difficult. 
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TABLE 2 
Ease/Difficulty of Standardising Marketing Activities 
Across Countries 
EASIER MORE DIFFICULT 
- brand name 
- product positioning 
- service standards 
- warranties 
- advertising themes 
- distribution 
- personal selling 
- sales person training 
- pricing 
- media selection 
Source: Takeuchi & Porter, 1986 
The inherently local character of marketing operations suggests 
that many activities will continue to be organised within local 
markets. But there are five activities that appear to offer gains 
from central organisation: 
material; 
production of sales and promotional 
and, 
marketing training; 
where products are 
global advertising (to some degree); 
service support. 
fairly complex, sales .force activity and 
economies of scale 
Working from the centre in these areas can yield 
in delivery, increase the rate of learning, 
simplify co-ordination with other activities and gain benefits by 
operating in a country with comparative advantage in that 
activity. 
which 
In fact the activities easiest to co-ordinate are 
allow for market segmentation and targeting and product those 
positioning - strategic market planning. 
This is quite consistent with Vandermerwe's (1989) model of pan- 
European marketing which rests on a division into regional mass- 
clusters, regional niche- clusters, and local niche-markets 
argues that protected markets and niches will vanish and that 
and 
marketing strategies will have to recognize a Europe-wide system. 
Marketing strategy here focuses on the identification of key 
market segments, 
segments, 
on product development and positioning for those 
and on co-coordinated product launches. 
The Example of.Jacobs Suchard 
Jacobs Suchard is an interesting example of a pro-active global 
marketing strategy with a high degree of standardisation of 
activities. Its strategy was recently described by an Executive 
Vice-President as follows: 
"At Jacobs Suchard we increasingly think global and not only 
in terms of 1992" (Zinser, 1989). 
Based on extensive economic, consumer and market research, 
Suchard's re-positioning has involved addressing all three types 
of mobility barriers. Marketing goals include the extension of 
successful concepts from one country to another. 
global brands, umbrella concepts, 
This implies 
conversion of key national brands. 
line extensions and the test 
An example of Suchard's aggressive internationalization of an 
established brand is the expansion of ‘Milka' 
tablet fnrm in IQQK ;+ 4" --.* -'I-- --ls -- -'- Sold only in a-* e . 
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to Austria, German, Switzerland, and France and in 1989 was to UK, 
Spain, Benelux, Italy, Holland, Argentine, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Canada, and the USA. 
With regard to product range, within each global brand Suchard 
practices harmonisation of recipes, packaging, sizes and line 
extensions combined with pruning of product ranges. Advertising 
implications of its global marketing strategy include a one copy 
strategy, one agency for the brand, harmonised advertising, a new 
approach to media planning and buying, and new advertising 
concepts. 
There is great clarity in Suchard, both about its strategic 
positioning (transnational brander) and the leverage behind it. 
Suchard sees itself responding to, and partly creating, global 
demand convergence with the international manufacturing centres 
and the other related elements of the marketing strategy represent 
a pro-active response to the changing economics of the business. 
The Lessons from Acquisitions 
These kinds of arguments imply a chain of causation running from 
the availability of cost savings in marketing overheads to the 
creation of consumer tastes sufficiently homogeneous to justify 
such marketing approaches. However, the push for strong producrs, 
product positioning and brands is not driven solely by 
considerations of cost. Major food companies with quality brands 
do perform strongly (see Stobart 1989) and are featuring 
prominently in the corporate restructuring and acquisition 
activity currently taking place in the food sector. 
Grover (1989) remarks that the food industry is in "the midst of a 
period of major structural change" and is "becoming increasingly 
consolidated by a few large companies'. He claims that 
"a handful of mega-scale food conglomerates is emerging, e.g. 
Nestle, Unilever, and BSN". 
He argues that the more fragmented'structure in southern Europe 
has made these countries particularly inviting as takeover targets 
and he cites some fragmentary evidence on the rate of acquisitions 
in Spain and Italy in support. The main evidence, however, 
concerns the number of domestic and cross-border takeovers in 
Europe in the food industry. Over one third of all takeovers 
between January 1988 and May 1989 were cross border in character. 
Much of this activity Grover attributes to the building of trans- 
European positions in which domination of particular product 
categories across Europe is being sought. 
The evidence on restructuring via acquisition is probably 
strongest from the experience of UK activity in the United States. 
Hamill and Crosbie (1989) show UK acquisitions of food and drink 
companies in the USA rising from $15 million in 1984 to over $7780 
million in 1988. The average size of these takeovers has risen 
from about $5 million to a something in excess of $555 million. 
AS a percentage of all UK takeover activity in the USA, food and 2-G .wL Cwlrah.rAYm 3mrrrr**mt*A in IQRQ Fnr nvcar 750: whereas in 1984 it 
/ / 
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background to this is the maturity and slow growth in I%%*-British 
domestic market and the relatively higher growth prospects in the 
USA. However, Hamill and Crosbie point out the emergence of 
global strategies among UK food and drink companies in which 
acquisitions are seen as the vehicles by which "critical mass" can 
be achieved. They go on to suggest that the development of strong 
national and international brand portfolios is being fostered by a 
select group of multinational companies. Their evidence is by no 
means conclusive, and does not itself discriminate between our 
strategic groups of Multinationals and Transnationals but does 
lend support to the general Northward movement in the strategic 
Space. 
Their prime conclusion is that the main objective of these 
companies has been brand leadership and market share in an 
industry which is becoming increasingly global. More pertinent is 
that these companies have chosen to pursue these ends primarily 
through acquisition. This contrasts with other better established 
international branders whose emphasis has been on 
internationalization of their existing portfolios with very 
selective acquisitions to fill in the gaps (e.g. Unilever and 
Suchard). 
The sheer scale of UK acquisitions in the USA suggests an emerging 
view that multinational and transnational portfolios are becoming 
very much more important. The fragmentary evidence within Europe, 
seems to point in the same direction. Common to all these 
examples is the feeling that markets are converging, that 
efficiencies in marketing, distribution, and production are 
possible, and - most important - that fundamental shifts in 
industry structures and in marketing strategies are taking place. 
Alternatively, a lot of very expensive mistakes are being made. 
5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The central theme of this paper has been the effect of industry 
dynamics on marketing strategy. A review of some of the current 
evidence, suggests that greatly increased potential for pan- 
European strategies has developed. If this is indeed the case, 
then international marketing strategy should give much more 
careful consideration to the following points: 
1. Product positioning will require greater attention to 
segmentation and some rethinking of how those segments are 
defined. If the boundaries of the industry are shifting 
then, so must the prevailing view of market segments. In 
particular, the selection of certain products as pan-European 
and others as local products, must be set not only against 
judgment of the possibilities for standardisation as opposed 
to local adaptation of each product,. but also against the 
context of much greater competitive threats in all 
categories. 
2. Marketeers will have to pay far more attention to 
competitors and their activities, particularly with reference 
to expansion of qeoqraphic coverage of products and any 
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acquisition activity extending product ranges or markets or 
both. 
3. Pan-European marketing strategies will include a 
rediscovery of branding. This will involve the need for 
greater understanding of how brands may become something 
other than national brands. Paradoxically, it will also 
entail a much clearer focus of brands in national markets to 
cope with new entrants. Finally, in support of branding, 
more extensive product development must provide the substance 
behind the brands. 
4. A greater emphasis on time and timing as an element in 
marketing strategy. The shortening of product life-cycles 
has become a commonplace. When this is combined with the 
speed of new product roll-out across selected international 
markets, coordination issues become still more sophisticated. 
In particular, speed of movement from R & D to the 
marketplace will be a major factor in competition. This will 
necessitate a-different type of marketing skill, the 
integration of marketing involvement and cooperation at much 
earlier stages of product development. 
5. Marketing must become more aware of cost, both the overall 
cost base of the company in comparison to its competitors and 
also, the structure of cost within the marketing function 
itself. Although this may seem a less obvious issue for 
marketing than some of the earlier points, it is probably the 
most central for grasping the possibilities of international 
marketing. One of the fundamental arguments for 
globalisation or regionalisation is the cost saving 
available. How do these cost efficiencies translate into 
marketing? Specifically what is required is an assessment of 
which marketing activities can be centralised to gain 
efficiencies and which should be locally delegated to retain 
responsiveness. The issues is one of judging the balance of 
sources of efficiencies in innovation, compared to sources of 
Cost efficiencies. Although these issues have not been much 
explored in this paper, it is clear that these are the new 
challenges in marketing management and control. 
Finally, this agenda for international marketing should be 
recognized as just as relevant for small as for large companies, 
since the more effectively the large competitors respond to these 
challenges, the tougher becomes the competitive environment for 
all. 
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